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ABSTRACT

The importance of the user interface increases particularly in safety-critical or mission-critical systems where the user has
time limitations within which to make correct, accurate, and timely decisions. User interfaces for these type of systems
should be well-designed, easy to understand and easy to use in order to be accepted by expert users and to support the users’
decision making under pressure. Otherwise mishaps or accidents may occur and consequences of accidents may include loss
of human life, large financial losses, and environmental damage. In this research, we study user interface complexity and
impacts of this complexity on users’ acceptance of that system. We use the measurements and experiments with the
Navigation and Piloting Expert System (NPES) and its operators to quantify our research. We report details of metrics,
measurements, experiment, findings, and conclusions.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION

Safety-critical systems are attracting a lot of attention due to the enormous catastrophic potential of these systems on their
constituents, bystanders, and the environment. These kind of systems are human-machine systems, comprised of networks of
human operators and other resources (such as facilities, technical components, etc.), that perform tasks and support the
missions and goals of more than one organization (Kapasouris, Serfaty, Deckert, Wohl, and Pattipatyi, 1991). Safety is the
most important aspect in these systems. Different types of information systems such as intelligent systems, decision support
systems, expert systems, and others have been developed and successfully implemented in these kind of environments to
reduce risk of accidents and mishaps. Some examples of safety-critical systems and information systems developed for them
are:







Aviation, ship, or space shuttle and their computerized control systems (Heudin, 1991; Coenen, Smeaton, and Bole,
1989),
Air traffic and its control systems (Perry, 1997),
Nuclear power plants and their control systems (Wong and Kalam, 1995),
Intelligent highways and their control systems (Dailey, Haselkorn, and Lin, 1993),
Medical systems such as intensive care units and patient monitoring system in these units (Leveson & Turner, 1993;
Halang, Sniezek, and Colnaric, 1998), and
Military and defense systems and their control and operation systems (Rouse, Geddes, and Hammer, 1990).

Poor user interfaces have contributed to disasters, including loss of life in safety-critical environments. For example, the
complicated user interface of the AEGIS tracking system was a contributing cause to the erroneous identification and
shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane which resulted with 296 losses. USS Stark's inability to cope with Iraqi Exocet
missiles which resulted with 37 losses and 21 injured was partly attributed to the human-computer interface (Neumann,
1991). Sometimes the implementation of the user interface can be at fault. A number of people died from radiation overdoses
partially as a result of the faulty cursor handling code in the Therac-25 accidents (Leveson and Turner, 1993). McKenzie’s
analysis of anecdotal descriptions of IS failure cases in the ACM’s Software Engineering notes also concludes that 92% of
computer related accidents involved with human-computer interaction (McKenzie, 1994). One such example is failure of
London ambulance service computer-aided dispatch system (Beynon-Davies, 1999).
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In safety-critical environments users (human operators) are decision-makers and their decisions are supported by
information systems. The importance of the user interface increases particularly in safety-critical or mission-critical systems
where the user has time limitations within which to make correct decisions (i.e. collision avoidance for ships). Safety-critical
systems must monitor the situation and provide warnings and/or alarms when there is possibly dangerous patterns in the
monitored parameters. Even the system works perfectly and without a glitch for mission completion, operator must get that
information, understand it, interpret it, and use it for right decision. In order to design an understandable and usable interface,
the human-computer interaction, computer-supported cooperative work, psychology, cognitive sciences, and human factors
disciplines have developed methodologies and determined critical elements for successful user interfaces.
However the question we need to answer is what makes a user interface a complex one and how different aspects of
complexity affects human operator’s decisions and behaviors. Which one is more important? Usability or functionality? It is
well known that expert users in safety-critical systems do not like computerized systems to do their job and teach them how
to perform their job. Instead, they would like to get data and facts from the system and use their own judgment and expertise
to make decisions. Thus, user interface complexity may have impact on expert users’ acceptance and utilization of
information systems in safety-critical environments.
Thus, in this study, our goal is twofold. First, measuring user interface complexity level for safety-critical systems, then
determining the impacts of user interface complexity on human operators’ acceptance of these systems. The sample system
utilized in this research was the Navigation and Piloting Expert System (NPES). We are reporting the results of complexity
measurements for two versions and the results of experiments with 3 users.
PREVIOUS STUDIES AND RESEARCH MODEL

Many researchers studied user interface complexity, metrics to assess complexity level, and impacts of complexity on
operators in safety-critical systems. Gerhardt, Javecchia, Andriole,and Miller (1995) on submarine displays, Adelman,
Cohen, Bresnick, Chinnis, and Laskey (1995) on real-time expert system which is used to identify incoming aircraft as friend
and foe, Chignell (1990) on metrics for real-time interface complexity, Andriole and Adelman (1995) on dimensions of user
interface complexity and metrics, Shneiderman (1998), Rowe, Sibert, and Irwin (1998) on air traffic management. Martelli,
Nofrini, Vendruscolo, and Visani (2003) evaluates HCI based on a) evaluation of user satisfaction using HCI, by
questionnaire survey; b) evaluation of the system’s complexity through objective observation of the user’s ability and
difficulties using HCI, by an independent scientist following a specific questionnaire. All these studies suggested and used
metrics to assess user interface complexity in different safety-critical systems in general.
The results of a survey on vessel traffic service (VTS) systems and human-computer interfaces at five waterways (Hoffman,
Riley, and Dion, 1998) show that monitoring, information processing, and communicating are the main tasks for subjects
concerned with safe vessel navigation such as VTS operators, vessel pilots, and masters. This study also measured user
interface-related issues using metrics such as ease of understanding displays, consistency of display terminology, sequence
of information presentation in displays, and consistency between displays and required tasks. Dix, Finley, Abowd, and Beale
(1998) also suggest three points for user interface evaluations:
•
•
•

To assess the extent of the system’s functionality
To assess the effect of the interface on the user, and
To identify any specific problems with the interface.

All above mentioned studies show that since each safety-critical system and operator needs in each system are different and
unique and each software's user interface should be different than others. Furthermore, the metrics to measure the complexity
of user interfaces may depend on the functionality of the software system and the characteristics of the users and they should
measure general complexity which will be common for all user interfaces as well as system-specific user interface
complexity which are unique to that particular system.
Thus we will classify the metrics for user interface complexity assessment into two main groups:
1- General User Interface Complexity Metrics
a) Effectiveness of display characteristics such as characters, highlighting, bolding, coloring
b) Amount of information being displayed and presented to user
c) Consistency of display and system terminology
d) Understandability of user interface
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e) Perceived complexity
f) Accessibility
g) Ease of learning and obtaining information from screen
2- System Specific Metrics
a) Functionality related complexity
b) System specific displays (such as charts, maps, figures)
c) Task support level for users
Beyond basic user interface issues there is second stream of research related to user interfaces. This research focus on
human’s understanding of information and data provided by user interface and accurate, faster, and better decision making.
Human information processing, learning, memory, decision making, problem solving, attention, perception are subjects for
this research stream (Adelman et al.,1995; Andriole and Adelman, 1995). It tries to explore what happens after the user
interacts with user interface and gets data from it. This can be seen as aftermath of human-computer interaction. Human’s
interaction with the user interface is first step. Once this is complete and human gets this information and data from the
interface, he/she will understand this information, use it for decision making, and make the decision for the system. It is
commonly called as cognitive engineering or usability. In this research, we will call it as decision support and explanation
complexity.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Tool: Navigation and Piloting Expert System (NPES)

The vehicle for this research is the Navigation and Piloting Expert System (NPES), an operational decision support system
developed by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute as part of the Lockheed Martin SmartBridge™ initiative. NPES is embedded in
SmartBridge™ navigation system and provides intelligent decision support to Chevron oil tanker ship's masters, mates and
pilots navigating the restricted waters of San Francisco Bay. The NPES is installed aboard the Chevron Colorado, an oil
tanker of Chevron Shipping Company, which sails between California and Prince William Sound, Alaska on a weekly basis.
There are two versions of NPES, referred to as NPES-1 and NPES-2. NPES-1 is the original version of NPES. It was
developed between 1996 and 1998. After NPES-1 was built, some additional design, functionality, reasoning, interface
changes were made, resulting in NPES-2. Thus, NPES-2 is the successor to NPES-1.
The Differences Between NPES-1 and NPES-2

The changes in NPES-2 user interface were mostly done to provide better information to the users. Some new functionality
was added to provide more detailed information such as ownship position and maneuvering limitations. The first difference
between the two versions' user interface was the chart used. NPES-1 uses a raster image digital chart, which looks like the
charts used in daily life by pilots and navigators. NPES-2 uses a fully vectorized electronic chart display information, which
gives a less real-life chart image, as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. There were also changes in message display style to
provide better and more noticeable information to the users. Blinking and red colored warnings, alerts, and alarms were used
in NPES-2, while NPES-1 used regular characters and black color for displaying these information. In terms of information
content, both NPES-1 and NPES-2 display the same one sentence warning for alerts/alarms. However, in NPES-2, if the user
wants to learn more details about that situation, additional information is available by clicking on the warning, alert/alarm
sentence. Beyond these there were some other differences between NPES-1 and NPES-2 as summarized in Table-1.
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Area
User Interface

NPES-1
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾

Decision Support,
Explanation

¾
¾

Raster image digital chart
Alerts and alarms provided with regular
characters, black color, and regular font
size
All information appears on top-level
display
Targets are represented with an x in a
circle
Advisory screen is separated from
collision avoidance and alarms/alerts
screen
Required tasks, Local/Pilot knowledge,
and environmental Info advisories are
displayed on the same screen by opening
three different windows
Fundamental maneuvering and collision
avoidance decision support
Alert and alarm information cannot be
seen when advisories screen is open.

NPES-2
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾
¾

Fully vectorized electronic chart display
information
Blinking warnings, alerts, and alarms
Red-colored alarms
User has to double-click for details
Added target direction arrow to targets and to
ownship to show headings of targets and heading
of ownship
Advisory and Collision avoidance screens are
shown together
Required tasks, Local/Pilot knowledge, and
environmental Info advisories are displayed
separately and one at a time
NPES off / on button
Detailed maneuvering and collision avoidance
decision support
Alert and alarm information is always available
and more distinguishable.
Explanation for reasoning provided
Alert and alarm information has dedicated screen
space

Table 1. Differences Between NPES-1 and NPES-2
Determining Complexity Levels For Two NPES Versions
Subjects and Experiment
3 US Navy Reserve Officer Training Center navigation and piloting officers were the human subjects for this research while two NPES
versions were subjects of complexity measurement experiments. Two of the subjects teach navigation and piloting-related courses and had
both theoretical and practical piloting knowledge. They also have operational experience in ship handling and vessel management. The
third officer was a senior student with theoretical knowledge and less real-life navigation and piloting experience.

The human subjects completed 10 simulated scenarios (5 with NPES-1 and 5 with NPES-2 in 3 to 4 sessions, each session
requiring 3-4 hours to complete. The first scenarios in randomization plan are used as warm-up scenarios and data is not
collected for them. After each scenario completion, users filled out questionnaire (with 7 point Likert-scale) and were
interviewed.
Users were run through assigned scenarios, which were differentiated based on their simulated location, situation shown
(crossing, meeting, overtaking), direction (inbound, outbound), and target numbers (single target, multiple target). Before the
experiments, each user was given information about NPES and instructed about how to use both versions. Each user used one
scenario for each version as a warm-up, in order to get familiar with the system, terminology, and the scenarios. The time
required for each scenario run and for completing the questionnaires was between 45 to 60 minutes.
Metrics

User interface complexity for both versions were determined using surveys administrated to NPES users. Based on previous
studies and suggestions from literature, we determined our metrics to include both general metrics as well as NPES-specific
metrics. The metrics used to determine the user interface complexity in NPES are:
1234-

Overall user perception for NPES user interface and screen design,
Effectiveness of display characteristics such as characters, highlighting, bolding, coloring,
Accessibility of NPES from the host system (accessibility),
Information amount and display (organization of information, easy access to information, adequacy of information
levels, consistency of information display),
5- User's perception of differences between chart representations in two versions (chart representation),
6- Consistency of display and system terminology (terminology),
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7- Ease of learning and obtaining information from screen
information),
8- Users' perception of advisory screen designs,
9- Perceived complexity of screen design (complexity), and
10- Understandability of user interface (understandability).
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and reaching details (learning, and ease of reaching

In order to determine how NPES information is used by users, how helpful it was, and how it impacted users' decisions,
metrics measuring these issues are used. These metrics are:
1- NPES recommendation acceptance score: this metric measures the average score of NPES recommendations accepted
by the users during decision-making.
2- The user’s understanding level of NPES output: This metric measures the user's understanding level for NPES
output. Since output included screen, chart, and all NPES user interfaces, three sub-metrics were determined.
3- User perception of support level for wide variety of decision types: This metric was used to measure NPES support
for different user tasks such as situation monitoring support level, threat determination support level, threat avoidance
support level, and maneuvering support level.
4- Screen complexity: This metric measures the users' ratings for NPES screen complexity.
5- Usefulness of provided information: Usefulness of information as well as amount and display characteristics is another
user interface characteristic.
6- Users perception of intelligence level of system output: Users' perceptions of quality and intelligence level for NPES
output is measured.
7- Usability of NPES: This metric measures the overall usability of NPES from the users' perspectives.
8- Attention requirement: Complex user interfaces in EIRTS can require users to pay more attention to details. In order
to measure users' perceptions of attention requirements, this metric is utilized.
9- Cognitive skills requirement: After users saw and gathered data from the user interface, they also processed that data
and information to make decisions. They used cognitive skills for this processing. Normally, raw data requires more
processing and more cognitive skills, while processed and interpreted data requires less process, and less cognitive skills.
Results

All metric values were calculated based on user scores (7 point Likert scale) for the questionnaire questions. Then results
were analyzed to determine the level of user interface and decision support and explanation complexity for NPES-1 and
NPES-2. The average values and significance test results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In tables 2 and 3, the more
complex NPES version for each complexity type highlighted, along with statistically significant differences between the
NPES versions, based on 2-tailed t-tests.
The results for the user interface complexity analysis shows that for all 10 metrics chosen, subjects preferred the NPES-1 user
interface, and for some metrics, the preferences were statistically significant (metrics 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10). The others were
not significant at the 0.05 significance level. Users significantly preferred NPES-1 for screen design and interface (pvalue=0.001), display characteristics such as highlighting, bolding, coloring (p-value=0.028), accessibility from
SmartBridge™ and to SmartBridge™ (p-value=0.002), amount and organization of information (p-value=0.014), ease of
finding and retrieving information (p-value=0.026), chart characteristics (p-value=0.056), and overall screen
understandability (p-value=0.00004). For other user interface-related characteristics such as terminology, learning and ease
of use, and information adequacy and consistency, users' preference was still NPES-1, but the preference levels were not
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
The results for the decision support and explanation complexity metrics also show that the subjects significantly preferred
NPES-1, a finding that was significant at the 0.05 significance level. Users found NPES-2 screen complexity and attention
requirements significantly greater than NPES-1 (metric 4, p-value=0.004), a negative indication. At the same time, users
found the NPES-1 screen and chart significantly easier to understand (metric 2, p=0.033 and 0.0039), more supportive
(metric 3, p- values =0.0026, 0.008, 0.046), more useful (metric 5 p=0.008), and perceived more intelligent (metric 6,
p=0.046).
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Metrics

NPES-1

NPES-2

t-value

p-value

Complex
Version

1- Operator perception of NPES interface

5.79

4.31

3.50

0.001

NPES-2

2- Display Characteristics

5.88

5.01

2.01

0.028

NPES-2

3- Accessibility of NPES from host

5.63

4.72

3.22

0.002

NPES-2

a) Organization, amount of info

5.31

4.29

2.33

0.014

NPES-2

b) Ability to find/retrieve information

6.00

5.00

2.11

0.026

NPES-2

c) Adequacy of levels of information

5.54

5.18

1.18

0.121

NPES-2

d) Consistency of information display

6.09

5.54

1.29

0.105

NPES-2

5- Operator perceptions of chart differences

6.54

5.27

1.656

0.056

NPES-2

6- Consistency of user interface terminology

6.2

6.0

0.44

0.33

NPES-2

7- Ease of learning user interface

5.75

5.73

0.076

0.469

NPES-2

8- User interface design complexity

5.84

5.50

1.101

0.141

NPES-2

9- User Interface Understandability

5.90

4.82

3.895

0.00004

NPES-2

4- Complexity of User Interface

Table 2. User Interface Complexity Analysis for NPES-1 and NPES-2

Metrics

NPES-1

NPES-2

t-value

p-value

Complex
Version

4.958

3.25

1.8147

0.0416

NPES-2

6.33
7
5.67

3.0
2.66
4.67

2.5
4.91
1.061

0.033
0.0039
0.174

NPES-2
NPES-2
NPES-2

- Support for Situation Monitoring

6.67

3.0

5.5

0.0026

NPES-2

- Support for Threat Determination

5.67

4.0

0.945

0.199

NPES-2

- Support for Threat Avoidance

6.33

3.33

4.025

0.008

NPES-2

- Support for Maneuvering

6.0

3.66

2.21

0.046

NPES-2

4- Screen Complexity

3.0

6.33

-5.0

0.004

NPES-2

5- Usefulness

6.33

3.33

4.025

0.008

NPES-2

6- Perceived intelligence level of system output

6.0

3.66

2.24

0.046

NPES-2

7- NPES is difficult to use

4.0

3.66

0.5

0.322

NPES-2

8- Requires more attention

4.66

5.33

-0.707

0.259

NPES-2

9- Requires more cognitive skills and thinking

6.33

6.33

0

0.5

NPES-2

1- NPES Recommendation Acceptance Score
2- Users Understanding level
a) Screen Understandability
b) Chart understandability
c) Overall NPES Understandability
3- User perception of Support Level

Table 3. Decision Support and Explanation Complexity Analysis for NPES-1 and NPES-2

Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004

3440

Coskun et al.

Impacts of User Interface Complexity in Safety-Critical Systems

These findings are consistent with the post-experiment interviews, where subjects reported that since NPES-1 user interface
and especially the NPES-1 chart provided more raw data, they felt they were making decisions with more information with
NPES-1. Also, the subjects reported that since NPES-1 user interface was showing information passively (did not require
clicking to get further details), they were getting information more easily with NPES-1 than with NPES-2. This feedback also
indicated that the listed metrics (especially chart, screen complexity, attention, and cognitive skill requirements, and ease of
information gathering) were used by subjects to determine decision support/explanation complexity.
The results also show that NPES-1 recommendations were accepted by subjects at a significantly higher rate than NPES-2
(p-value 0.0416), indicating that subject decisions were supported better with NPES-1. The subjects' ratings also show that
NPES-1 support for situation monitoring, threat avoidance, and maneuvering tasks -- the key elements of navigation decision
support-- are significantly better (p-values=0.0026, 0.008, 0.046 respectively), also indicating better decision support for
users.
After all these analyses, we conclude that NPES-2 user interface is more complex than NPES-1 user interface and the users
thought that NPES-1 was providing better support.
INTERVIEW RESULTS

Interviews with all 3 subjects before, during, and after the experiments (scenario runs) were conducted and their
understanding of NPES, NPES complexity, and possible impact areas for complexity were gathered during these interviews.
A summary of subjects' opinions and feedback on different issues are summarized under different topics.
Users' Perception of NPES in General

All subjects reported that they believed NPES would definitely help decision-makers on a ship, and they reported that they
would like to see and use NPES during their work. However, job threat was a concern for all subjects, especially experienced
users. They reported that NPES would not (and should not) replace humans, and they cannot trust NPES results. They also
mentioned that they would be cautious when they use NPES, while a relatively inexperienced subject said he would use the
system most of the time. All users preferred NPES as a raw data provider, and as a warning system when there was a threat,
collision risk, or when ownship exceeds certain limits. This perception played an important role in complexity. For example,
although NPES-2 recommendations were complete, more detailed, and more informative, users preferred NPES-1's short and
not very detailed recommendations. When they were asked why they preferred NPES-1, their answers cited different issues,
such as chart type, user interface design, ease of information gathering, and the summary information provided by NPES-1.
This shows that users prefer to be decision-makers and not applicators for these type of systems. They would like to gather
necessary data and process information, but they would not like the system to do everything for them. This was particularly
true for experienced users.
NPES Complexity

When users were asked what was their understanding of NPES complexity, they reported mostly about user interface and
usability-related issues such as chart type, ownship and target-ship symbols, and reaching detailed explanations of NPES
recommendation and information.. Users preferred "passive" (one of the user's definition) screens, which means that users do
not have to click somewhere in order to get information or detail. The information and data should be provided on the screen
automatically. Another complexity issue was users' familiarity with the system features. For instance, since NPES-1 uses
raster charts which are scanned from the paper charts used by navigators and pilots, and NPES-2 uses vectorized electronic
chart, users significantly preferred NPES-1 charts. They mentioned that their familiarity with raster charts was a determining
factor for NPES-1 preference.
NPES Functionality and Improvements

Users mentioned that they would like to see NPES as an aid and not as a director, telling them what to do. They said that
NPES should show all available information, but should not make decisions for them. They found most NPES features
helpful and a good tool for decision-making. NPES was especially helpful for situation assessment. All three users agreed
that advisories provided significant input for decision-making. NPES' help with situation assessment, threat detection,
collision avoidance tasks were also mentioned, although the users did not always agree with NPES solutions. This was
particularly true for NPES-2, where users disagreed with almost 50% of NPES recommendations. However, they also
mentioned that NPES-2 screen design was poorer because of the vectorized chart, and the double clicking requirement for
detailed information. These factors were important for their decisions. When they were asked how to improve NPES, they
reported that more details about NPES reasoning after each recommendation or warnings; more information about the target
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vessels such as speed, direction, type, weight, and class should be added to NPES. Also, NPES details of assumptions for
recommendation and warnings, and better display of ownship and targetship on the screen were reported as new
improvement areas. One last functionality improvement reported was adding aural warnings for alerts/alarms.
These results also underscore the importance of user interface designers talking with system users during and after the
development of interface. Interface designers and real-life users see and evaluate issues differently. The intention for changes
from NPES-1 to NPES-2 was providing more functionality, more details and information, and better support to users.
However, this study showed that users were not thinking the same thoughts as developers and designers about improving the
system.
The user performance analysis and feedback from users showed that operator performance would be enhanced with the less
complex NPES-1. User scores were significantly favorable toward NPES-1 for decision accuracy, user confidence, decision
quality, system and output understandability, and system usability. In addition, users found NPES-2 to be significantly more
stressful, requiring more attention, inducing more fatigue, and more complex to use. For workload, decision time, and
physical effort metrics, NPES-1 was preferred by users, although the results were not significant at the 0.05 significance
level.
LIMITATIONS

This study has a number of limitations that should be considered when interpreting the results. Many of these limitations are
associated with empirical investigations of operational systems, and are not unique to this research. This study was an
investigation of a single system deployed aboard a single vessel operating in a safety-critical system. The second limitation is
associated with the number of operators utilized in the operator performance experiments. The subject pool for qualified
operational ship navigation officers was relatively small, and those with experience in ship simulation and vessel navigation
and piloting (rather than ship logistics, or weapon systems, or engineering systems) further restricted the available subject
pool. The strength of the results could clearly have been enhanced with a larger subject pool for the operator performance
experiments. The third limitation is related to experiment setting. The ideal environment for assessments of the impacts of
complexity on operator performance is the domain under study, the marine transportation system in San Francisco Bay. The
authors have had experience with operational studies in similar environments (Grabowski & Sanborn, 2001). However, the
sponsors for this study were most comfortable with empirical assessments of the system capabilities in simulation, rather than
operational, mode. Comparative studies of simulated and operational results are the subject for further research.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

This study shows the importance of user interface and decision support explanation complexity on users' perceptions. The
differences between the two user interface designs affected users' decisions, preferences, and perceptions. This should always
be considered and given priority for the systems in safety-critical environments where human users are decision-makers and
beneficiaries of system output and results. Another important issue is usability vs. functionality. Increasing system
functionality will result with more complex system and probably system usability will decrease. Does this mean we need to
sacrifice from usability? Can we should balance functionality and usability, especially in safety-critical systems which
requires both. How training and operator background are related with complexity could be another research topic. If
operators are trained can they accept more complex systems with more functionality? More detailed research with safetycritical systems and their operators in real-life settings is needed.
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